OPINION: Age of Chimerica?
The Jakarta Post, 28 November 2009
Continuity, not change, is what most Chinese elites believe they will see in the relations of two global titans — the US and China — and has been confirmed by both heads of state during recent Barack Obama’s visit to China.
It would be a continuity based on common awareness and acknowledgement of the interconnectedness of their fate and the effects of their interactions with the global community.
It is also a continuity driven by compromise to prioritize the economic slump, while each strives to be one step ahead in the realignment of global power constellation.
Security concerns, such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and Iran, as well as the US desire for China to play some role in Afghanistan and Pakistan, heighten the need for compromise.
Even more pressing is the cooperation in pushing for greater and more comprehensive climate change policies ahead of the Copenhagen climate conference.
In his earlier campaign speech, Obama said China was, “Neither an enemy nor a friend, but a competitor that needs to be held responsible for regional stability.”
He also demanded greater respect for human rights and currency adjustments, to which Chinese elites reacted composedly. They have learned from dealing with all the post-Nixon administrations how campaign rhetoric against China means little by the time president-elects came to office. Indeed so with Obama.
In a recent interview with Reuters, prior upon his departure to China, he said, “I see China as a vital partner, as well as a competitor. The key is for us to make sure that competition is friendly.”
Continuity is also believed to be a manifestation of maturing bilateral relations. The US and China have gone through periods of tension, stability and institutionalization.
The latter is manifested with the inception of the Strategic Economic Dialogue between the US Treasury and its Chinese counterpart, and the Senior Dialogue on Security and Political Affairs involving the US State Department and the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
This desire for continuity is an overarching mood of China’s elites. Nevertheless, China’s elites consist of a political spectrum that is complex and anxious about the ramifications of global economic crises.
During the initial stage of the crisis, China had to face a downslide of economic growth, an increasing unemployment rate, corruption, climate disasters, which has fuelled anxiety in some of the leaders.
Yet by August 2009, numbers showed China did not only survive the crisis but rebounded spectacularly. This is a serious boost of confidence preceding the summit.
China’s engagement with America is not merely for the sake of China’s pursuit for international prestige and influence. It is fundamentally about how it would serve China’s national interests.
The likelihood of a G2 (US-China) framework would be less obvious, if we looked at it from China’s perspective.
In several high-level meetings involving China’s foreign policy makers earlier, party elites determined the direction of China’s diplomacy.
There will be a slight shift from Deng Xiaoping’s earlier philosophy taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei (keep a low profile, bid time and do something) to a more active diplomacy (jiji waijiao) and enhance her functional diplomacy (lingyu waijiao).
However, China will be more cautious in leadership roles to avoid getting involved in too many complications. Additionally, China has acknowledged and welcomed the growing multipolar, not bipolar, system — a system deemed to serve her national interests better than any other polarity.
China is gearing up with her multilateral policies and continues to try and actively participate in many regional institutions that have been offered by different heads of state.
Despite the preferences China may have on regional institution frameworks she would prefer, China has refrained from asserting a regional leadership role so far. Avoiding her neighboring countries’ anxiety may be one of the contributing aspects.
However, dealing with mounting domestic challenges may be the greatest concern for party elites, despite the relatively encouraging statistics we can find in the media or other reports.
It is interesting that Obama mentioned internet freedom in China. Indeed, cyberocracy is phenomena that should not be underestimated. There are nearly 350 million internet users and more than 60 million are keen bloggers.
Not to mention the interconnectedness of the Internet and mobile users. This virtual public space will play a significant role in shaping public opinion and public-state engagements in the future, if not already.
So, no, it may not be the age of Chimerica yet. Nevertheless, Sino-US relations will remain as the most important bilateral relationship for a while.
Continuity, not change, is what most Chinese elites believe they will see in the relations of two global titans — the US and China — and has been confirmed by both heads of state during recent Barack Obama’s visit to China.
It would be a continuity based on common awareness and acknowledgement of the interconnectedness of their fate and the effects of their interactions with the global community.
It is also a continuity driven by compromise to prioritize the economic slump, while each strives to be one step ahead in the realignment of global power constellation.
Security concerns, such as the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and Iran, as well as the US desire for China to play some role in Afghanistan and Pakistan, heighten the need for compromise.
Even more pressing is the cooperation in pushing for greater and more comprehensive climate change policies ahead of the Copenhagen climate conference.
He also demanded greater respect for human rights and currency adjustments, to which Chinese elites reacted composedly. They have learned from dealing with all the post-Nixon administrations how campaign rhetoric against China means little by the time president-elects came to office. Indeed so with Obama.
In a recent interview with Reuters, prior upon his departure to China, he said, “I see China as a vital partner, as well as a competitor. The key is for us to make sure that competition is friendly.”
Continuity is also believed to be a manifestation of maturing bilateral relations. The US and China have gone through periods of tension, stability and institutionalization.
The latter is manifested with the inception of the Strategic Economic Dialogue between the US Treasury and its Chinese counterpart, and the Senior Dialogue on Security and Political Affairs involving the US State Department and the Chinese Foreign Ministry.
This desire for continuity is an overarching mood of China’s elites. Nevertheless, China’s elites consist of a political spectrum that is complex and anxious about the ramifications of global economic crises.
During the initial stage of the crisis, China had to face a downslide of economic growth, an increasing unemployment rate, corruption, climate disasters, which has fuelled anxiety in some of the leaders.
Yet by August 2009, numbers showed China did not only survive the crisis but rebounded spectacularly. This is a serious boost of confidence preceding the summit.
China’s engagement with America is not merely for the sake of China’s pursuit for international prestige and influence. It is fundamentally about how it would serve China’s national interests.
The likelihood of a G2 (US-China) framework would be less obvious, if we looked at it from China’s perspective.
In several high-level meetings involving China’s foreign policy makers earlier, party elites determined the direction of China’s diplomacy.
There will be a slight shift from Deng Xiaoping’s earlier philosophy taoguang yanghui, yousuo zuowei (keep a low profile, bid time and do something) to a more active diplomacy (jiji waijiao) and enhance her functional diplomacy (lingyu waijiao).
However, China will be more cautious in leadership roles to avoid getting involved in too many complications. Additionally, China has acknowledged and welcomed the growing multipolar, not bipolar, system — a system deemed to serve her national interests better than any other polarity.
China is gearing up with her multilateral policies and continues to try and actively participate in many regional institutions that have been offered by different heads of state.
Despite the preferences China may have on regional institution frameworks she would prefer, China has refrained from asserting a regional leadership role so far. Avoiding her neighboring countries’ anxiety may be one of the contributing aspects.
However, dealing with mounting domestic challenges may be the greatest concern for party elites, despite the relatively encouraging statistics we can find in the media or other reports.
It is interesting that Obama mentioned internet freedom in China. Indeed, cyberocracy is phenomena that should not be underestimated. There are nearly 350 million internet users and more than 60 million are keen bloggers.
Not to mention the interconnectedness of the Internet and mobile users. This virtual public space will play a significant role in shaping public opinion and public-state engagements in the future, if not already.
So, no, it may not be the age of Chimerica yet. Nevertheless, Sino-US relations will remain as the most important bilateral relationship for a while.
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