Carnegie China 2023 Expert Poll: Has Xi’s Diplomacy been Effective in Southeast Asia?
The full results are available here.
From Indonesian perspective, Christine Susanna Tjhin, Director of Strategic Research at the Gentala Institute explained:
The general trend of bilateral relations has progressed, despite the pandemic-related slowdown. Similar to his predecessors, Indonesian President Joko Widodo has practiced a China policy focused heavily on economics. Although the bilateral trade deficit is often criticized, it is decreasing, and China (along with the United States and India) remains equally important contributors to Indonesia’s exports and overall trade surplus.
From the early stages of the BRI from 2012 to 2015, China was barely among the top ten investors in Indonesia, but nowadays, China has climbed into top five. Last year, Indonesia received the highest foreign direct investment inflows in its history, and China ranked second behind Singapore as the largest investor. With the end of China’s Zero COVID policy, optimism among Indonesian businesses is palpable.
Sociopolitical relations have also progressed, albeit at a slower pace. The very active Confucius Center in Al-Azhar University Jakarta, the Sino-Indonesia Friendship Library in Central Java Grand Mosque, and the increasing availability of scholarships for Muslim students are a few anecdotes of China’s soft power drives. These factors, combined with Indonesia’s own domestic complexities and China’s relative discipline to avoid becoming publicly involved in or commenting on Indonesia’s politics, have contributed to the relative silence of Indonesian officials and elites regarding Xinjiang issues—to the dismay of human rights proponents and some Muslim groups.
Regardless of the long-held suspicion and concern over China’s security apparatus, including its maneuvers in the South China Sea, security cooperation has been helpful for Indonesia’s own quest for military modernization. Security and high-tech development, which were highlighted during China’s recent political events, will be an important arena to watch. Technology transfer alongside Chinese investments has been favorable for Indonesia, as seen in high-speed rail construction and vaccine diplomacy.
Institutionally, instead of further optimizing the foreign affairs ministry’s role, Widodo set up a “one door” mechanism through the informal appointment of special envoys to China. The ramifications of such a “centralized” mechanism and its potential risks to the relationship in the long term are worth debating. So far, however, China has been effective in adapting to it.
From the early stages of the BRI from 2012 to 2015, China was barely among the top ten investors in Indonesia, but nowadays, China has climbed into top five. Last year, Indonesia received the highest foreign direct investment inflows in its history, and China ranked second behind Singapore as the largest investor. With the end of China’s Zero COVID policy, optimism among Indonesian businesses is palpable.
Sociopolitical relations have also progressed, albeit at a slower pace. The very active Confucius Center in Al-Azhar University Jakarta, the Sino-Indonesia Friendship Library in Central Java Grand Mosque, and the increasing availability of scholarships for Muslim students are a few anecdotes of China’s soft power drives. These factors, combined with Indonesia’s own domestic complexities and China’s relative discipline to avoid becoming publicly involved in or commenting on Indonesia’s politics, have contributed to the relative silence of Indonesian officials and elites regarding Xinjiang issues—to the dismay of human rights proponents and some Muslim groups.
Regardless of the long-held suspicion and concern over China’s security apparatus, including its maneuvers in the South China Sea, security cooperation has been helpful for Indonesia’s own quest for military modernization. Security and high-tech development, which were highlighted during China’s recent political events, will be an important arena to watch. Technology transfer alongside Chinese investments has been favorable for Indonesia, as seen in high-speed rail construction and vaccine diplomacy.
Institutionally, instead of further optimizing the foreign affairs ministry’s role, Widodo set up a “one door” mechanism through the informal appointment of special envoys to China. The ramifications of such a “centralized” mechanism and its potential risks to the relationship in the long term are worth debating. So far, however, China has been effective in adapting to it.
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